Elicit: Effects of Rent Control on Housing Dynamics (public)
Effects of Rent Control on Housing Dynamics (public)
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September 12, 2025
What are the effects of rent control policies on housing market dynamics and tenant stability?
Rent control policies yield mixed results, decreasing rents in controlled units by 4-47% and extending tenant stays by up to six years, while simultaneously reducing housing supply and increasing eviction filings, with effects varying by policy design and local market conditions.
Abstract
Rent control policies yield mixed effects on housing market dynamics and tenant stability. In regulated markets, studies report rent declines ranging from 4% to 47% in controlled units while some analyses note rent increases in uncontrolled or post‐decontrol sectors. In one San Francisco study, rents rose concurrently with a 15% reduction in housing supply and a 20% drop in tenant mobility. Other research documents tenants staying an extra six years under tighter regulation, although reports of 83–127% higher eviction filings suggest displacement risks in certain settings.
Separate analyses show shifts in market composition. For example, one study cited annual rent subsidies of about US$2440 (roughly 27% of income), and another observed reduced racial disparities accompanied by increased minority presence. These findings, based on quasi‐experimental and econometric approaches across diverse jurisdictions, indicate that the impacts of rent control vary with policy design and local market conditions.
Methods
We analyzed 40 sources from an initial pool of 989, using 8 screening criteria. Each paper was reviewed for 5 key aspects that mattered most to the research question. More on methods
Papers identified with Elicit search
n = 989
Papers screened using: Intervention Type, Outcome Measures, Study Design, Geographic Context, Public/Social Housing Focus, Housing Voucher/Assistance Focus, Empirical Data, Comparison Groups
n = 989
Papers screened out
n = 949
Papers included for extraction
n = 40
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Paper search
Using your research question “What are the effects of rent control policies on housing market dynamics and tenant stability?”, we searched across over 126 million academic papers from the Semantic Scholar corpus. We retrieved the 989 papers most relevant to the query.
Screening
We screened in sources based on their abstracts that met these criteria:
- Intervention Type: Does this study examine rent control, rent stabilization, or rent regulation policies?
- Outcome Measures: Does this study measure at least one of the following: housing market outcomes (rental supply, housing prices, construction rates, property maintenance, market competition) OR tenant stability outcomes (residential mobility, displacement rates, tenure length, eviction rates, housing security)?
- Study Design: Is this study one of the following: randomized controlled trial, quasi-experimental design, natural experiment, longitudinal study, cross-sectional study with comparison groups, systematic review, or meta-analysis?
- Geographic Context: Was this study conducted in urban or metropolitan areas with rental housing markets?
- Public/Social Housing Focus: Is this study NOT focused solely on public housing or social housing programs without rent control components?
- Housing Voucher/Assistance Focus: Is this study NOT examining only housing voucher or rental assistance programs without rent regulation?
- Empirical Data: Is this study NOT purely theoretical or modeling without empirical data?
- Comparison Groups: Is this study NOT a case study or descriptive study without comparison groups or control conditions?
We considered all screening questions together and made a holistic judgement about whether to screen in each paper.
Data extraction
We asked a large language model to extract each data column below from each paper. We gave the model the extraction instructions shown below for each column.
- Study Design Type:
Identify the primary research design used in the study. Look in the methods section for explicit description of the study design.
Possible design types include:
- Difference-in-differences
- Quasi-experimental
- Empirical analysis
- Econometric study
- Cross-sectional analysis
If multiple design elements are used (e.g., difference-in-differences with discontinuity design), list all relevant approaches. Be precise about the specific methodological approach.
If the design type is not clearly stated, review the analytical methods and statistical techniques used to infer the most appropriate design classification.
- Geographic Setting and Context:
Extract the specific geographic location(s) where the study was conducted. Include:
- Country
- City/metropolitan area
- Specific neighborhoods or regions (if applicable)
If multiple geographic areas are studied, list all of them. Note any specific contextual details about the housing market that are relevant to understanding the rent control policy (e.g., housing density, urban vs. suburban, economic conditions).
If geographic context is not explicitly stated, check methods, data sources, and results sections for implicit geographic information.
- Rent Control Policy Details:
Extract comprehensive details about the rent control policy:
- Year of policy implementation
- Specific type of rent control (first-generation, second-generation, etc.)
- Key policy mechanisms (e.g., price caps, exemptions)
- Scope of application (which housing units are covered)
Look in introduction, methods, and policy description sections. If multiple policy aspects are discussed, provide a comprehensive summary.
If policy details are complex, create a bulleted list to capture nuanced information. Note any explicit exceptions or special conditions in the policy.
- Policy Impact Outcomes:
Identify and extract the specific outcomes measured related to rent control policy:
- Rental prices (regulated and unregulated sectors)
- Housing supply
- Land values
- Maintenance investments
- Tenant stability
- Demolition rates
- Housing market dynamics
Extract quantitative values where available. If multiple outcomes are measured, list all with their specific measurements and statistical significance.
Prioritize outcomes directly addressing rental prices, housing supply, and market dynamics. Look in results and discussion sections for comprehensive outcome reporting.
- Key Quantitative Findings:
Extract the primary quantitative results, focusing on:
- Magnitude of effects
- Statistical significance
- Confidence intervals or standard errors (if provided)
- Directional impact of rent control policy
Prioritize results that directly answer the research question about housing market dynamics and tenant stability.
If multiple statistical models or analyses are presented, extract results from the primary or most comprehensive analysis. Include specific numeric values and percentage changes where available.
Ensure extracted findings are directly quoted or paraphrased from the results section, maintaining the original statistical context.
Results
Characteristics of Included Studies
Study
Study Location/Period
Rent Control Policy Type
Primary Outcomes Measured
Methodology
Full text retrieved
Diamond et al., 2019a
San Francisco, USA; 1994 onward
Not explicitly labeled; limits rent increases, multi-family 2-4 units built 1900-1990
Rental prices, housing supply, tenant stability, maintenance
Quasi-experimental
Yes
Jofre-Monseny et al., 2023
Catalonia, Spain; 2020
Not specified; price caps, high coverage
Rental prices, housing supply
Difference-in-differences, event-study, quasi-experimental
No
Munch & Svarer, “Rent Control and Tenancy Duration”
Denmark
Not specified in abstract
Tenancy duration, mobility
Econometric study
No
Mense et al., 2017
Germany; 2015
Second-generation; exception for new units
Rental prices, land values, supply, maintenance
Difference-in-differences with discontinuity, quasi-experimental
No
Breidenbach et al., 2021
Germany; 2015
Not specified in abstract
Rental prices, quality
Quasi-experimental (triple difference event study)
No
Mense et al., 2019
Germany; 2015
Second-generation; rent ceiling, multiple exceptions
Rental prices, supply, land values, maintenance, mobility
Quasi-experimental (difference-in-differences with discontinuity)
Yes
Gyourko & Linneman, 1989
New York City, USA; 1943 onward
First-generation; rents frozen, later exemptions
Rental prices, supply, tenant stability, maintenance
Econometric, cross-sectional
Yes
Autor et al., 2012
Cambridge, MA, USA; 1970-1995
First-generation; strict caps, no vacancy decontrol
Rental prices, supply, land values, maintenance, turnover
Quasi-experimental, difference-in-differences, econometric
Yes
Early & Phelps, 1999
USA; 1984-1996
Not specified; new construction exempt
Rental prices (uncontrolled sector), supply
Econometric study
No
Fallis & Smith, 1985
Toronto, Canada
Not specified; exemptions
Rental prices (controlled/uncontrolled)
Econometric, cross-sectional
No
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Across 40 studies of rent control policies, the following patterns were observed:
Primary Outcomes Measured:
- Rental prices:Measured in 25 studies.
- Housing supply (including new construction and conversions):Measured in 20 studies.
- Tenant stability (including tenure duration, mobility, turnover, and displacement):Measured in 16 studies.
- Maintenance, quality, investment, or renovations:Measured in 9 studies.
- Evictions or eviction filings:Measured in 3 studies.
- Land values, property values, or wealth transfer:Measured in 5 studies.
- Vacancy rates:Measured in 2 studies.
- Market dynamics (including spillovers, misallocation, search/matching costs, and disequilibrium):Measured in 6 studies.
- Rent burden, rent discounts, or rent subsidy:Measured in 4 studies.
- Community composition or segregation:Measured in 2 studies.
- Owner/tenant knowledge, queue time, and income distribution:Each measured in 1 study.
- Other outcomes (such as distribution, race, tenant welfare, and consumption):Found in 5 studies.
Rent Control Policy Type:
- First-generation rent control:Studied in 7 studies.
- Second-generation rent control:Studied in 10 studies.
- Third-generation rent control:Studied in 1 study.
- Rent stabilization:Explicitly labeled in 3 studies.
- No clear specification of policy type:21 studies.
- User value system (other):1 study.
Methodology:
- Quasi-experimental methods (including difference-in-differences, event study, regression discontinuity, interrupted time series, and triple difference):Used in 24 studies.
- Econometric methods (including cross-sectional and empirical econometric analysis):Used in 21 studies.
- Empirical analysis (not otherwise specified):Used in 11 studies.
We did not find mention of some outcomes or policy types for several studies, either due to lack of reporting or lack of access to the full text.
Effects
Effects on Housing Market Dynamics
Study
Outcome Measure
Effect Direction
Effect Size
Statistical Significance
Diamond et al., 2019a
Market rents, supply
Increase in rents, decrease in supply
15% supply reduction, 20% decrease in mobility
No mention found
Jofre-Monseny et al., 2023
Average rents
Decrease in rents
4–6% reduction
No mention found
Munch & Svarer
Tenancy duration
Increase in duration
+6 years (most vs. least regulated)
No mention found
Mense et al., 2017
Rents (regulated/unregulated), land values
Increase in unregulated, decrease in regulated, increase in land values
No mention found
No mention found
Breidenbach et al., 2021
Rental prices
Decrease in rents (short-term)
Up to 5% (all), 9% (some types)
Significant, effect vanishes after 1 year
Mense et al., 2019
Regulated/free-market rents
Decrease in regulated, increase in free-market
No mention found
No mention found
Gyourko & Linneman, 1989
Rent subsidy
Increase in subsidy
$2440/year (27.2% income)
95% confidence interval: $2367–$2511
Autor et al., 2012
Rents, property values
Increase in rents post-decontrol
40% (controlled), 13% (never-controlled)
No mention found
Early & Phelps, 1999
Uncontrolled rents
Increase in rents
Positive, significant
Yes
Fallis & Smith, 1985
Rent difference
Attributable to controls
~50% of difference
No mention found
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Across 40 studies, the following patterns were observed in effect direction and statistical significance:
- Decrease in rents:Reported in 11 studies.
- Increase in rents:Reported in 10 studies. Some studies reported both increases and decreases, depending on market segment (for example, regulated versus unregulated units).
- Decrease in supply or construction:Found in 4 studies.
- Increase in supply or construction:Found in 3 studies.
- Increase in tenant stability or tenure:Found in 2 studies.
- Decrease in tenant stability or tenure:Found in 1 study.
- Increase in evictions or displacement:Found in 3 studies.
- Decrease in evictions or displacement:Found in 1 study.
- Increase in property or land values:Found in 1 study.
- Decrease in property or land values:Found in 1 study.
- Increase in vacancy:Found in 2 studies. We did not find studies reporting a decrease in vacancy.
- Increase in rent burden, savings, discounts, or subsidy:Found in 5 studies.
- Mixed, minimal, or no effect:Reported in 5 studies.
- Other outcomes (queue times, demographic changes, misallocation costs):Reported in 2–3 studies.
Statistical significance:
- Explicit statements of statistical significance:Found in 9 studies, based on available full texts or abstracts.
- Explicit statements of non-significance:Found in 2 studies.
- No mention of statistical significance:In the available full texts or abstracts for the remaining 29 studies.
The most common outcome measures were rents or rental prices, supply or construction, tenant stability, tenure or mobility, evictions or displacement, property or land values, and rent burden, savings, or subsidy. We did not find mention of outcome measure information in the available full texts or abstracts for some studies, and some studies reported multiple outcomes.
Effects on Tenant Stability and Demographics
Tenant Composition and Income Distribution
Study
Outcome Measure
Effect Direction
Effect Size
Statistical Significance
Gyourko & Linneman, 1989
Rent subsidy, tenure
Increase in subsidy, increase in tenure
$2440/year, significant tenure increase
95% confidence interval: $2367–$2511
Donner & Kopsch, 2023
Subsidy, queue, income
Increase in subsidy for high-income, increase in queue
21 vs. 10 years (high vs. low subsidy)
No mention found
Chen et al., 2023
Rent discount, race
Decrease in racial disparity, increase in discount
$410/month, $4–5.4B/year
No mention found
Sims, 2011
Minority/poor presence
Increase in minority, decrease in poor
No mention found
Robust
Zapatka & Galvao, 2022
Rent burden, composition
Decrease in burden, increase in Hispanic/foreign-born
No mention found
No mention found
Ahern & Giacoletti, 2022
Wealth transfer
Regressive
2–8% by income
Significant
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Across these 6 studies:
- Outcome measures:
- Rent subsidy or discount: 2 studies.
- Regressive or high-income benefit effects: 2 studies.
- Minority or racial/ethnic composition or disparity: 2 studies.
- Rent burden: 1 study.
- Wealth transfer: 1 study.
- Some studies covered multiple topics.
- Effect direction:
- Regressive effects or greater benefits for high-income groups: 2 studies.
- Positive effect of subsidy on tenure: 1 study.
- Reduced racial disparity: 1 study.
- Increased minority presence and decreased poor presence: 1 study.
- Reduced rent burden with increased Hispanic/foreign-born presence: 1 study.
- Statistical significance:
- Statistical significance or robustness was reported in 3 studies, based on available full texts or abstracts.
- We did not find mention of statistical significance in the available full texts or abstracts for the other 3 studies.
Residential Mobility and Tenure Duration
Study
Outcome Measure
Effect Direction
Effect Size
Statistical Significance
Diamond et al., 2019a
Mobility
Decrease in mobility
20% reduction
No mention found
Munch & Svarer
Tenancy duration
Increase in duration
+6 years
No mention found
Mense et al., 2019
Mobility
Decrease (high-income), increase (low-income, short distance)
No mention found
No mention found
Karpestam, 2022
Mobility
Decrease (older units), increase (newer units)
5.7% decrease with 10% increase in income
No mention found
Nagy, 1997
Tenure duration
Increase in duration (stabilized)
No mention found
No mention found
Chapple et al., 2022
Outmigration
Decrease (low socioeconomic status, stabilization), increase (market-rate)
1–2% increase in outmigration
No mention found
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Across these 6 studies:
- Outcome measures:
- Mobility: 3 studies.
- Tenancy or tenure duration: 2 studies.
- Outmigration: 1 study.
- Effect direction:
- Decrease only (in mobility): 1 study.
- Increase only (in tenancy/tenure duration): 2 studies.
- Mixed effects, with both increases and decreases depending on subgroup or context (for example, by income, unit age, or stabilization status): 3 studies.
- Effect sizes:
- 20% reduction in mobility: 1 study.
- 5.7% reduction in mobility with a 10% increase in income: 1 study.
- Increase of 6 years in tenancy duration: 1 study.
- 1–2% increase in outmigration: 1 study.
- Statistical significance:
- We did not find mention of statistical significance in the available full texts or abstracts for any of the 6 studies.
Neighborhood Segregation and Community Composition
Study
Outcome Measure
Effect Direction
Effect Size
Statistical Significance
Sims, 2011
Segregation
Increase in segregation
No mention found
Robust
Chapple et al., 2022
Exclusionary impact
Increase in exclusion
No mention found
No mention found
Chen et al., 2023
Racial disparities
Decrease in disparities
No mention found
No mention found
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Across these three studies:
- Outcome measures:
- Segregation: 1 study.
- Exclusionary impact: 1 study.
- Racial disparities: 1 study.
- Effect direction:
- Increase in the measured outcome (segregation or exclusion): 2 studies.
- Decrease in disparities: 1 study.
- Statistical significance:
- Statistical significance was described as “robust” in 1 study.
- We did not find mention of statistical significance in the available full texts or abstracts for the other 2 studies.
References
J. Munch, Michael Svarer\ (2001).Rent Control and Tenancy Duration
J. Weber\ (2017).The Regulation of Private Tenancies - A Multi-Country Analysis
J. Gilderbloom, Linxin Ye\ (2007).Thirty Years of Rent Control: A Survey of New Jersey Cities
E. Glaeser, Erzo F. P. Luttmer\ (1997).The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control
Mats Wilhelmsson, R. Andersson, K. Klingborg\ (2011).Rent Control and vacancies in Sweden
E. Goetz\ (1995).A Little Pregnant
Philipp Großkurth\ (2006).ECONOMIC PAPERS
David P Sims\ (2011).Rent Control Rationing and Community Composition: Evidence from Massachusetts
J. Nagy\ (1997).Do Vacancy Decontrol Provisions undo Rent Control
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The removal of rent control and its impact on search and mismatching costs: evidence from Oslo
A. Oust
2018·
17 citations
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Study Design Type
Quasi-experimental
Geographic Setting and Context
- Country: Norway - City/metropolitan area: Oslo - Specific neighborhoods or regions: Not specified - Contextual details: The study focuses on the private residential rental market in Oslo, with a population of approximately 1 million in the metropolitan area. The removal of rent control in 1982 is a central aspect of the study.
Rent Control Policy Details
- Year of policy implementation: During World War I - Specific type of rent control: Initially first-generation, later transitioned to second-generation - Key policy mechanisms: Rent control enforced by local boards, involvement of boards in setting initial rents, prohibition of eviction without reason, restrictions on converting rental units to owner-occupied homes - Scope of application: Rental homes and co-operative housing, with exemptions for pre-World War II brick buildings until 2010
Policy Impact Outcomes
- Rental prices: Not directly addressed in terms of quantitative values. - Housing supply: The deregulation may have accelerated the decrease in households renting their residence. - Land values: Not mentioned. - Maintenance investments: Not mentioned. - Tenant stability: Rent control increased the distance from ideal dwellings; removal reduced search and mismatching costs. - Demolition rates: Not mentioned. - Housing market dynamics: Shift from "housing wanted" to "housing for rent" advertisements; increased disclosure of asking rents; reduction in large deposits.
Key Quantitative Findings
- The removal of rent control led to a shift from "housing wanted" to "housing for rent" advertisements, indicating a change in market dynamics. - Landlords became more willing to disclose asking rents in their advertisements. - The number of "housing for rent" advertisements with detailed characteristics increased dramatically, reducing search costs for tenants. - The removal of rent control reduced tenants' search and mismatching costs in the private residential rental market in Oslo. - The number of flats under rent control decreased from 44,000 to 12,000 and then to 3,500. - Large deposits became less common after deregulation.
ABSTRACT The removal of the Norwegian rent control in 1982 created a natural experiment that enabled us to investigate whether rent control affected the search and matching process in the private residential rental market in the Norwegian capital, Oslo. We collected and analysed data on ‘housing for rent’, ‘housing wanted’ and ‘housing exchange-wanted’ advertisements in Oslo covering a period from 1970 to 2008. We concluded that the use of newspaper listing services by potential tenants and landlords changed after the rent control removal. Our results indicate that it is more costly, in time and money, for a potential tenant to search for and to find a home under rent control. Moreover, our results indicate that rent control increases the probability of and the distance from the ideal dwelling, in size, standard and location, a potential tenant have to settle for.
Introduction
suggest that perhaps 40 to 50 per cent of the world's urban population lives in rental housing of one kind or another. Most of these households live in units subject to controls on rent paid, making rent control one of the most essential subjects of debate in the study of housing. The Norwegian rent control was removed in 1982. This removal created a natural experiment that enabled us to investigate whether rent control affected the search and matching process in the private residential rental market in the Norwegian capital, Oslo.
Adopting the terminology proposed by Arnott (1995), rent control in Oslo transitioned from a second-generation system, where rents were allowed to increase at approximately the same level as the consumer price index (CPI), to a system permitting the landlord to stipulate any rent in new contracts, while still protecting tenants bound by existing contracts against unreasonable rent increases. In the classification developed by Lind (2001), Norwegian rent control transitioned from Type E to Type A (whereby the former refers to smoothing price changes to protect all tenants against certain types of increases in market rentssegregation-related rent regulation, and the latter denotes weak transaction cost-related rent regulation, protecting existing tenants against rent levels exceeding the market rate). Lind's classification system is more fully described below.
According to Lind (2001), rent regulation can have two main purposes. The first is to protect existing tenants against major increases in market rents caused by greater demand. The second aim is to ensure that renting attractive properties is not prohibitively expensive for households on lower incomes. Despite the importance of these phenomena, Arnott (1995) and Olsen (1988) point out the scarcity of research on the detriments and benefits of rent control. They argue that, even though there is broad agreement about the detrimental effects of first-generation rent control, second-generation rent control might not be as harmful as is widely perceived. The problematic aspects of rent control are expressed in a well-known 1992 survey of economists, in which Alston et al. (1992) found that over 90 % of respondents believed that rent control decreased the quantity and quality of rental housing in their area.
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the harmful effects of rent control are acceptable costs, if control leads to a desired distribution of welfare. Arnott and Igarashi (2000) concur with this view, claiming that rent control could be appropriate for distributional reasons, as its removal would imply major shifts in welfare from lower to higher deciles of income distribution.
Given the variety of rent control programs, empirical studies offer the most valuable information for assessing second-generation rent control characteristics and outcomes (Arnott, 1995). This view is supported by Olsen (1988), while Kutty (1996) posits that the effect of rent control on housing supply and rental quality is theoretically ambiguous and must be empirically determined.
In line with the studies conducted by Gibb (1994), Bailey (1999) and Oust (2013a, b) , our data is collected from newspaper advertisements. While the above studies used the "housing for rent" advertisements to examine how the rent has developed and whether the removal of rent control affected the rent prices in Scotland and Norway, this paper studies the advertisements more directly. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the removal of rent control changed the way landlords and potential tenants used newspaper listing services in the private residential rental market. Although newspapers have more or less been replaced by the internet as the main location for this type of listing services, the transfer value to study internet listing services should be very large. We want to test whether or not the eventual changes in the search and matching process were advantageous for the potential tenants. The hypothesis we want to test is: the removal of rent control made it easier for potential tenants to access a large number of "housing for rent" advertisements, with descriptions of key characteristics. The intuitive position is that if potential tenants have access to a large number of "housing for rent" advertisements, with descriptions of key characteristics, this would reduce their search-and mismatching costs. Reduced search cost would here imply that a potential tenant would have to use less time and money to find a home. Reduces mismatching cost would mean that the potential tenant, with lager probability, would be able to rent a dwelling closer to the ideal dwelling, in size, standard and location.
We investigated this hypothesis by asking several questions. First, did "housing wanted" or "housing for rent" advertisements dominate the market place? A "housing wanted" advertisement is an advertisement where a potential tenant is asking if someone could offer him/her a place to rent. These types of advertisement typically include the type of dwelling wanted, where in the city the potential tenant wants to live and some information about the potential tenant, typically gender, age and occupation. A "housing for rent" advertisement is an advertisement where a landlord is offering a dwelling for rent. Second, how easily could potential tenants and landlords get information about the current rent level through the newspaper listing services? How willing were landlords to disclose their asking rent in the newspaper advertisements? Third, how many "housing for rent" advertisements existed where the key characteristics like location, type, size and asking rent were available.
To give a deeper understanding of changes in the newspaper listing services that could have impacted potential tenants' search-and mismatching cost, we present data on the share of the "housing for rent" advertisements that wanted a special kind of tenant or that wanted some kind of extra service in addition to, or instead of, rent, and the share of "housing wanted" advertisements that were posted in the newspaper by the potential tenant's employer and the share of potential tenants that offered some kind of extra service on top of the rent or instead of the rent.
At the end of the paper, we present data on deposit size and the number of "housing exchange-wanted" advertisements. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to use this approach to investigate whether the removal of rent control affected the search and matching process in the private residential rental market.
We find that use of newspaper listing services by potential tenants and landlords changed after rent control removal. The newspaper listing services went from being dominated by "housing wanted" advertisements to having a higher share of "housing for rent" advertisements. Landlords become more willing to disclosure their asking rent in their "housing for rent" advertisements. The number of "housing for rent" advertisements where key characteristics like location, type, size and asking rent was available increased dramatically. We find that landlords, in the periods we are studying, went from posting "housing for rent" advertisements in the 1970s where they often asked for a special type of tenant and where they frequently sought some kind of extra service in addition to or instead of rent, to posting "clean" advertisements where the focus was on information about the dwellings. Until the mid-1980s, it was more normal that employers posted "housing wanted" advertisements on behalf of their employees than afterwards (these advertisements were typically larger, included the logo or the name of the company in large print, and said that an employee in the company needed a place to live, giving contact information for someone in the company or the potential tenant). Until the removal of rent control, 5 to 10 % of potential tenants posted "housing wanted" advertisements where they offered some kind of extra service on top of or instead of rent.
We also find that landlords started asking for a smaller deposit size, and the thresholds dividing the rental market into several sub-markets disappeared in the years following the removal of rent control. We conclude that the removal of rent control reduced tenants' search and mismatching cost in the private residential rental market in Oslo. Higher search and mismatching cost under rent control is yet another way rent control reduces the total social welfare (here in a utility, meaning of the word) produced in the private residential rental market, reducing the social welfare to be distributed.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Review of pertinent literature is presented in the first section, followed by an introduction to the Norwegian rent control and the Oslo rental market. The subsequent section is dedicated to the study data description, followed by the results and their discussion. The final section offers some key conclusions.
Literature Review
After World War II, rent control was widespread across many European and some US cities, and still plays an important role in many housing markets (Haffner et al., 2008;Lind, 2001; O'Sullivan & De Decker, 2007; Turner & Malpezzi, 2003). Given the importance of the property market (and thus rental sector) in the economy, findings yielded by studies examining the effectiveness of rent control often serve as arguments in the political discussion. Even though, in the last two decades, shifts toward market deregulation became more prevalent, authors of several recent studies have attempted to quantify the effect of rent deregulation (Lind, 2003). Conducting comparative studies of rent control removal is very difficult because of the great heterogeneity of housing markets, making every new case where it is possible to conduct before-and-after studies interesting and highly valuable. Oust (2013a) analysed the removal of the rent control in Norway in 1982, focusing on the developments in rent and house prices. His findings revealed that the rents landlords demanded were in line with the market clearing rent in both the period with rent control (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) and the period following its abolishment . Thus, Oust (2013a) concluded that the Norwegian rent control did not have the desired welfare distribution effects. Gibb (1994) and Bailey (1999) analysed the removal of rent control in Scotland in 1988, specifically examining rent development in Glasgow and Edinburgh before and after deregulation. Both studies revealed that rent increases in Glasgow after deregulation were barely in line with inflation, and those in Edinburgh were actually below the corresponding inflation levels. In addition, after deregulation, rent increases were lower than the increase in house prices. Gibb (1994) also found that, after deregulation, a greater number of landlords operated in the rental sector and real rents remained relatively stable. At the same time, the concentration ratio declined, different properties were being rented out, and the geographical distribution of rental units changed. Bailey (1999) concurred with the view that rent levels had not risen in real terms, suggesting a smooth adjustment process, with supply keeping pace with demand.
Another interesting empirical study was conducted by Sims (2007). Sims analysed the removal of rent control in Massachusetts in 1995. He found that rent control was able to depress the rents at the same time as having a small effect on the construction of new housing. In addition, Sims found that rent control encouraged owners to shift away from rental status. One shortcoming of this study, as Sims pointed out, is the short time span after deregulation, making the data set pertaining to rent control effects in Massachusetts small. Moreover, the data may be affected by fluctuations in the business cycle and the possibility that the market may not have reached a new equilibrium, creating a fundamental problem of unit undersupply.
When interpreting the effects from the studies above one should be aware of that deregulation is not an exogenous event. Maybe politicians tend to deregulate when the effects are expected to be small, as the number of people against the deregulation can then be expected to be smaller.
Sims's results are in line with those reported in the extant literature on rent control summarised by Arnott and Igarashi (2000). As the authors pointed out, in general, if rent control depresses rents, it will reduce the housing supply, reducing the total welfare produced in the residential rental market.
In this respect, the microeconomic intuition that relates a rent ceiling to diminishing quantity and quality of residences in the tenancy market has been supported by several theoretical explorations (Basu & Emerson, 2000, 2003;Raess & Ungern-Sternberg, 2002;) and empirical analyses (Albon & Stafford, 1990;Alston et al., 1992; Gyourko & Linneman, 1990a , 1990b;Johnson, 1951). Gyourko and Linneman (1989), Nagy (1995) and Gleaser and Luttmer (2003) studied the New York controlled rental market, finding misallocation of housing units. Other authors examined the reduced mobility in the housing market under rent control (Ault et al., 1994;Clark & Heskin, 1982;Gyourko & Linneman, 1989;Munch & Svarer, 2003;Nagy, 1995;Skak & Bloze, 2013). Lind (2001) has developed a classification system for rent regulations with Types from E to A, described in short below.
Types A and B cover only sitting tenants, and concerns the rent when a contract is extended or when the fixed rent comes to an end, while types C, D and E, cover both new tenancies and sitting tenants. The first-generation rent controls can be seen as an extreme version of this kind of rent regulation, as they not only stopped real increases in rents but in fact led to falling real rents as a result of nominal rent freezes and inflation. Some versions of what Arnott (1995) called second-generation rent control are also of type E, but less extreme. The landlord is allowed to increase the rent if costs increase, but not just because an area has become more popular.
The laws
Rent controls were imposed in Norway and Oslo during World War I as part of a more extensive price capping that encompassed almost all trade sectors. The controls were implemented to avoid damaging price increases at a time of crisis, to ensure affordable housing for the growing working class in the main cities, and to prevent profiteering. Initially, rent controls aimed to stabilise nominal rents, reflecting what Arnott (1995) calls a firstgeneration rent control system that lasted until after World War II. Norway subsequently introduced a more flexible system of rent control, which was subjected to a series of minor revisions. This was, following the terminology of Arnott (1995), a second-generation system, allowing local housing rent boards to decide what level of increase was permitted in a given year. These approved increments were often at the same level as increases in the CPI, but were starting from an already low rent level. While larger increases were allowed if the rental property was upgraded, the size of these increases had to be approved by the rent committee.
After World War II, Norway experienced a housing shortage, and the government imposed price controls on houses and flats built with government support. The involvement of authorities in the housing sector was exercised either through support for co-operative building or through provision of financial aid for families that wanted to build small houses of moderate standard. Oslo stimulated the supply of housing by giving financial support to the co-operative company OBOS and making large areas of land available to it (Hansen & Guttu, 2007). This policy was successful and, by the end of the 1960s, the housing market had more or less normalised. As the supply of accommodation substantially increased, lack of housing was no longer considered an immediate problem, although house prices and rents were still increasing. 1954-1982/88 Price regulations on new/old flats.
1976-1983
Condominium conversion forbidden. Description of the regulation and deregulation in the Norwegian house market. Reference: Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004) The regulation and deregulation of the Norwegian housing market are summarised in Table 1 . As can be seen from the data, in addition to rent control in Norway, price control was imposed on houses and flats built with government support after World War II. As the price was tied to the initial building cost, which increased over time, significant differences emerged in the price of housing within the system. Many families who had moved into small flats that were subject to price control just after World War II had experienced a sharp increase in their standard of living, and wanted to leave their flats for houses. To afford this transition, they needed to obtain the full market price for their flats. The system was increasingly perceived as unfair. In 1969, the price control on houses built with financial aid from the authorities was removed. In 1970, co-operative housing was the only controlled market left; it remained under regulation until the end of 1987, when OBOS, the last cooperative, removed price control. Hence, co-operative housing has its own price index, distinct from the price index used in this work.
The rent system in Norway was characterised by four main elements:
(1) Rent control was enforced through a system of local rent boards that decided how much the rent could increase from one year to the next.
(2) Landlords were supposed to involve the rent board in setting the rent when letting a dwelling for the first time. In practice, the rent boards were seldom involved in the pricing. Although most landlords set the rent independently, they were supposed to comply with the rent control rules.
(3) The regulations prohibited eviction of tenants without reason. A short list of grounds for eviction was codified in the laws, and landlords faced the burden of proving violations.
(4) To maintain sufficient supply of rental units, landlords' opportunity to convert flats from rentals to owner-occupied homes was restricted. While this stipulation was not in place in the 1969 to 1975 period, the process was time-consuming and this option was thus rarely exercised.
One of the problems with the rent control system was its dependence on tenants reporting excessive rents to the relevant authorities. If a tenant did not accept the rent and it was in conflict with rent control, he or she could bring the matter to court. For the tenant, the benefit of reporting an excessive rent stemmed from the fact that, upon signing the rental contract, he or she could obtain a lower rate in the new contract. However, this was rarely the case in practice. As we show later, it seems that most tenants simply accepted the rent that the landlord offered in order to find somewhere to live.
The repeal
The removal of rent control through the Act of June 11, 1982 # 44 came less than one year after the Conservative Party took power for the first time in more than a decade. With the support of the centrist parties, the government started pushing for reforms. Rent control for new rental contracts was removed, but remained in force for old contracts on pre-World War II brick buildings until 2010. In addition, condominium conversion was now allowed, and removal of price controls on co-operative housing was permitted. These rapid changes present a natural experiment that allows us to study the effects of the removal of rent control. In the classification developed by Lind (2001), Norwegian rent control transitioned from Type E to Type A.
In 1999, a new Rent Act came into force in Norway. However, since rent control was not a part of the previous Rent Act of 1939, price control on most flats had already been removed in 1982. Consequently, the Rent Act of 1999 caused minor changes in the manner rents were determined. The Act accepted existing market rents for new tenancies. According to the Act, market rent is never regarded as unfair. In existing contracts, rent increases can only be made once a year, and should not exceed the changes in the CPI. A larger revision is permitted every third year to ensure that the rent follows the market trend. The normal time period for a fixed-term contract is three years.
After the 1982 Act came into force, a number of rent-controlled flats still remained in Norway. To protect lifelong tenants, rent control was optioned as a transitional rule for pre-World War II blocks of flats, in some of the larger cities. The number of flats covered by the transitional rule in Oslo was approximately 44,000 in 1981 and fell to approximately 12,000 flats in 1992 (Ot. Prp. Nr. 82 1997-98) . After 1999 the transitional rule was changed so that it only protected existing tenants. Brattbakk (2007) estimated that, in 2006, only 3,500 flats that were under rent control were left in Oslo. These remnants of the old rent control were abandoned on January 1, 2010. The main reason for the drop in the number of flats included in the transitional rule was that after the general removal of rent control, condominium conversion was no longer forbidden. Many of the existing tenants became owners of the flats instead of renters and if the tenant living moved, the flats typically were converted and sold instead of being let again.
The rental market in Oslo and Norway
Oslo is the capital of Norway, and by far the country's largest city, with a population of 487,363 in 1970 and 560,484 in 2008 . Metropolitan Oslo has a population of approximately 1 million. In the second half of the 19th century, both the population and the construction sector activity increased sharply.
In Norway, there is a strong tradition of living in owner-occupied dwellings (Bengtsson, Ruonavaara and Sørvoll, 2017). The period of intense urbanisation at the start of the 1900s marked a break with this tradition, with an increase in landlord-owned blocks of flats in the cities. Owing to the emergence of this trend, there has been a strong political will to make it easier for common people to own their homes. This policy was successful and, at 77 %, Norway is now among the countries with the highest home ownership rates. For the capital Oslo, the figure is 69 % (Table 2 ). The removal of rent control came amidst a strong increase in owner-occupancy. According to the available data, 16 % of households living in owneroccupied homes are in co-operative housing. In addition, the 23 % of population living in rental housing comprises 18 % residing in private rentals and 5 % living in social housing (2001 figures). The table shows the percentage of households in Norway that are tenants. In the 20th century, Oslo went from having very few owner-occupying households to about 69%. Household data presented in the table is from the censuses of population and dwellings in Norway undertaken by Statistics Norway in the years 1920, 1970, 1990, 2001 and 2011. We have no comparable figures for 1981, but have national data from the National Housing Conditions Survey showing a tenant share of 31% in 1973, 27% in 1981, and 21% in 1988 .
The deregulation of the rent market may have accelerated the decrease in the percentage of households renting their residence. Before the deregulation, professional landlords typically owned blocks of flats, where condominium conversion was forbidden. (The term professional landlord is here used to distinguish them from non-professional landlords typically renting out one or two flats in their own house. In Norway, a person owning four or fewer flats, and no other commercial property, is regarded as a non-professional landlord.) These properties were typically divided into separate flats and sold to people that chose to take residence there themselves. After some time, as shown in Table 3 , professional landlords re-entered the market, but opted for holding other asset types. It is also evident that non-professionals comprised a significant share of the rental market, occupying a wide variety of flats. The composition of the rental market in Norway, 1973 Norway, -2001. . All numbers denote 1000s.
Reference: Langsether et al., 2003 This major change was a result of the deregulation of the housing market, which enabled many tenants in pre-World War II blocks of flats to buy their flats at a low price (In Norway there existed, and still exists, a law that gives the tenants the right to buy the apartment that they are living in, if the owner of the apartment building wants to register the apartments as independent legal entities. The price the tenant have to pay is 80% of the market price. If the owner want to sell the apartments as separate units, they have to be registered as independent legal entities.) Consequently, the residential rental market started to primarily serve young people, who chose to rent before becoming home owners. More than 90 per cent of all Norwegians become home owners during their lifetime (Gulbrandsen & Nordvik, 2007). The decline in the number of flats owned by professional landlords is probably to a large degree caused by the same policy. The pre-World War II blocks of flats were previously primarily owned by professional landlords. When these flats where sold to the tenants, it took some time before the number of properties held by professional landlords increased to the 1970s' levels.
The data required for meeting the study objective were collected in two datasets. The first datasets (the yearly dataset) consisted of gathering rent information, deposit amount, type of residence, number of rooms, property size (in square meters), address and identification information (landlord's phone number and advertisement number) for 27,907 flats and houses advertised for rent in Oslo. While the sample generally included only the advertisements that were registered in August, exceptions were made for the years with few advertisements, for which July and September were included as well, as these months represent the time of year in Norway with the largest number of observations could be made.
Once the sample was formed as described above, entries were checked and those missing certain items or containing data that could bias the indices were excluded from the analysis. Thus, advertisements that had one or more of the following features were excluded:
Properties not identified as any of the flat types or as a house Properties located outside the Oslo area, defined here as more that 30 km or 30 min away from the city centre Repeated rent advertisement with no time interval between tenancies Properties with a rent period shorter than 6 months Dwellings without bathroom, inside toilet or cooking facilities Rent includes other services, such as babysitting, renovation, etc. Advertisements not specifying rent Fake advertisements for dwellings that do not exist ("Housing for rent" advertisements have from time to time been used by sellers of other types of goods or services, like books or lawns.)
In the second dataset, we counted the number of "housing for rent" advertisements and "housing wanted" advertisements for the five first weekdays of August. The counting was carried out at five-year intervals (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2008) .
We imposed the criteria applied to the first phase noted above, with the exception of the dwelling type and rent. The main aim of the second dataset was to establish differences in the housing supply and demand in the Oslo area for the years examined. We also use this dataset to look at requests (by landlords) and offers (from potential tenants) of other services, such as babysitting, renovation, etc.
In conducting the survey, we were aware of one important limitation-the data gathered reflected solely the rent information about dwellings advertised through the listing service, Aftenposten, the largest listing service in the study period. According to Langsether et al. (2003), in Norway, about one third of tenants find their dwelling through listing services.
However, the gathered data pertain to the part of the market that wasmost affected by rent control. It should, nonetheless, be noted that the information obtained in this manner excludes rents in public or semi-public housing, which constitute about one fourth of the market (Langsether et al., 2003). Still, this is not a significant issue for the present study, as the government does not need rent control to ensure that cost of dwelling in the public and semi-public sector is below the market clearing rent. Thus, these submarkets are less likely to have been influenced by rent control.
Results and discussion
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the removal of rent control changed the way landlords and potential tenants used newspaper listing services in the private residential rental market. We also want to test whether or not the eventual changes in the search and matching process were advantageous for potential tenants.
The first question we asked was 'did "housing wanted" or "housing for rent" advertisements dominate the market place?' Another important shift in the market search and matching behaviour can be detected. In Figure 1 we can observe a shift in how potential tenants and landlords used newspaper listing services. Prior to the removal of rent control, "housing wanted" predominated, whereas in other periods, "housing for rent" advertisements become more prevalent.
This is a significant shift in the market search and matching behaviour, which was not evident prior to 1990. This pattern coincides with the "bust" cycle in the Norwegian housing market; the observed shift could have been caused by rent deregulation, as it persisted even after the bust cycle was over. If the demand for rental housing was higher than the supply of rent controlled dwellings, the need for advertisements would diminish. While it is difficult to claim causality between the removal of rent control and the shift in the type of advertisements, it is evident that the trend was positive for the tenants. It also likely benefitted the search and matching process, since the properties of the dwellings should be more important than the properties of the tenants. "Housing for rent" advertisements instead of "housing wanted" advertisements should then lower the total searching cost giving a social benefit. The second question we asked was 'how easily could potential tenants and landlords get information about the current rent level through the newspaper listing services?'. Figure 2 shows how often landlords chose to put the asking rent in their "housing for rent" advertisements. The data presented reveal a marked change in the number of "housing for rent" advertisements that included the asking rent in the period when the rent control was removed. More specifically, in the period affected by rent control, only around 20% of the advertisements specified the asking rent. After the deregulation, the fraction of advertisements including an asking rent increased rapidly to about 80%.
One possible reason for the change in the percentage of advertisements specifying rent value may be reluctance to advertise illegal rent in the newspaper (Oust, 2013a) . However, irrespective of the motivation behind this shift, the share of landlords that advertised their properties with an asking rent increased significantly after the removal of rent control. The third question we asked was 'how many "housing for rent" advertisements where the key characteristics like location, type, size and asking rent were available?'. Figure 3 shows yearly observations of the average number of "housing for rent" advertisements placed in the newspaper Aftenposten that specified asking rent. We have also added the equivalent number of advertisements for the Internet listing service Finn.no between 2001 and 2008, to Figure 3 reveals four important effects, namely (a) a greater number of "housing for rent" advertisements included an asking rent, (b) greater prevalence of landlord advertisements relative to those placed by tenants, (c) the business cycle effect, and (d) at the end of the time series, a large majority of "housing for rent" advertisements were placed over the Internet.
It is also evident that the change in the tenant searching cost lags behind the rent control removal. Once the transformation is complete in 1989, a large push from the business cycle can also be noted. However, the transformation clearly commenced before the start of the business cycle and the effect persisted even after the business cycle ended. It is natural for market changes to experience some lag time, especially when the change in the searching behaviour is as large as the one demonstrated here.
The intuition behind these three questions was that if potential tenants had access to a large number of "housing for rent" advertisements, with description of key characteristics this would reduce their search and mismatching cost.
The conclusion is that it became much easier for tenants to obtain information about both dwelling characteristics and rent though listing newspaper services after the removal of the rent control, which is likely to have resulted in a much lower tenants' searching cost. Thus, while a time lag relative to the removal of rent control is evident, this was clearly the most important change in the rental market during this time period.
0,7 % 0,7 % 0,7 % 0,5 % 2008 0,0 % 1,2 % 0,0 % 0,2 % The table shows the share of "housing wanted" advertisement that was posted by the potential tenant's employer or where the potential tenant offered some type of extra service in addition to the rent and "housing for rent" advertisements that wanted a special kind of tenant or wanted some kind of extra service in addition to or instead of rent.
In Table 4 we present data on the share of the "housing for rent" advertisements that wanted a special kind of tenant or that wanted some kind of extra service in addition to or instead of rent. In the 1970s and early 1980s, when rent control was in place, landlords could be very specific in their advertisements about which type of tenant they wanted. It was most common that the advertisements asked for a specified gender, followed by age, couples, couples without children, type of occupation and in some advertisements religion (strong Christian beliefs) of a desired tenant or even indicating an area of Norway he/she should originate from. Sometimes, owing to overly narrow and stringent requirements, these could be met by a very few households.
Rent control might have contributed to the emergence of this situation. Given that many potential tenants would typically be willing to pay the controlled rent that was lower than the market clearing rent, landlords could impose other criteria, given that they could not increase rent as a means of finding the most suitable tenants. While this practice might have given the landlord additional options, it clearly created a strong possibility of discrimination. The fall in the share of advertisements that had a specific request about the type of tenant the landlord wanted seems to have started before the removal of rent control.
It was also more common for landlords to require various additional services (Table 4 ). Babysitting was the most common extra service landlords asked from their tenants. However, the advertisements revealed a wide range of other services, such as garden work, snow clearing, driving, renovation help, et cetera. The value of some of these extra services was substantial, and led to lower asking rents or "free" housing.
Potential tenants would also offer to do extra services for the landlord in their "housing wanted" advertisements (Table 4 ) before the removal of rent control. Most of this advertisements offered janitor work, renovation and garden work, snow clearing, but also baby-sitting.
Such requests and offers for additional services might be perceived as a way for the landlord to achieve the rent level that is closer to the market clearing rent. In addition, as determining the exact value of these additional services was difficult, their inclusion into rental agreements made it possible to avoid discussions on violation of the rent control. On the other hand, many landlords probably needed these services, and having a flat provided an opportunity to obtain them without incurring additional costs.
In practice, however, requests for extra services reduced the number of suitable potential tenants, creating fewer matching opportunities in the market. Consequently, tenants seeking a dwelling would, on average, have to search for a longer time to locate suitable property.
Table 4 also shows that until 1985, about 10 to 15% of the "housing wanted" advertisement was posted by the potential tenant's employer. Some potential tenants also had their parents or a relative to post the advertisement for them. This would typically be the case, if the parents or the relative had a prominent position. To have an employer posting the "housing wanted" advertisement seems to have been beneficial to the tenant, indicating implicit and sometimes also an explicit employer guarantees, implying that other potential tenants would have a disadvantage.
The size of deposits seems to have changed as well once rent control was abolished (Table 4 ). Large deposits were more common in the "housing for rent" advertisements early in the time period included in this analysis. In the period from 1970 to 1982, high deposits were not uncommon, and could be as large as 100 to 150 times the monthly rent, typically ranging from 50 to 60 monthly rents (Table 5 ). While this may seem excessive, it is important to note that the rent was rather low. After 1982, it was rare to find such excessive deposit requests. Nonetheless, in the first few of years after the deregulation, a few advertisements still stipulated deposits equivalent to 50 to 60 monthly rents.
High deposits might be yet another way to bypass rent control, as tenants would be required to contribute most or all of the equity needed to own the flat, and/or give the landlord additional income from the interest from the deposit.
High deposits are likely to exclude a number of potential tenants, thus making the matching process difficult for households with low income and limited savings. Consequently, rental units for which high deposits are required can be perceived as a submarket to which many of the potential tenants would not have access. 1970-1982 1983-2008 1978-1982 1983-1987 More than 5 times the rent 12.8% 0.7% 13.6% 4.8%
More than 10 times the rent 8.2% 0.2% 6.2% 1.6%
More than 20 times the rent 5.8% 0.12% 3.7% 0.8%
The data pertains to the percentage of deposits defined as large (deposits that are equivalent to 5, 10 or 20 monthly rents). The prevalence of high deposits in the period with and without rent control, and just before and right after the deregulation, is contrasted.
The newspaper Aftenposten also had an advertisement column for those that sought to exchange housing (Figure 4 ). This exchange market was still active in the early 1980s, but started to become less prominent during the late 1980s, and effectively ceased to exist in the early 1990s. Households used this feature to advertise that they wanted to exchange dwellings. The column contains both dwellings for rent and owner-occupied dwellings. Among the self-occupied dwellings, co-operative flats are the most common. Price regulation for the largest co-operative in Oslo, OBOS, existed until 1988. Co-operative housing occupants also incurred rent costs, as well as some type of deposit. However, as length of these advertisements was limited, most did not specify if the advertised dwelling was a rental unit or an owner-occupied unit. However, the flats with known status seemed to be quite evenly distributed between owner-occupied and rental. The exchange market for rental housing seems to have constituted approximately 5 % of the total advertisement market before the removal of rent control. A typical example of an "exchange wanted" advert would stipulate that a household needs a flat of a different size or in a different geographical location. One reason for the existence of this exchange submarket is gains that can be achieved by exchanging dwellings that have controlled rent, as this reduces living costs. To be sitting on a rent contract, with a low rent seems to have a value in itself. Indeed, the advertisements often highlighted low rental cost.
From 1999 it was no longer possible to transferrent contracts for dwellings under the transitional rule to a new tenant. The result was that exchange-wanted advertisements for rental housing disappeared from the newspaper.
Exchange of housing, instead of two separate search and match processes, reduced market size. While not many households would seek to exchange dwellings, this nonetheless reduced the size of the main market.
While Oust (2013a) argued that the rents landlords demanded were in line with the market clearing rent in both the period with rent control (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) and the period following its abolishment , we argue that the rent control had an effect on the rent, and had a significant effect on the search and matching process in the private residential rental market. This might have been seen as a paradox since the findings in this paper might indicate queues and shortages before the deregulation, and then rents could have been expected to increase in order to reach a more balanced situation.
Figure 2 shows that the share of "housing for rent" advertisements with an asking rent was close to 20% before the removal of rent control. Table 4 shows that between 8 and 20 % of the "housing for rent" advertisements included the request for some kind of service in addition or instead of the rent. This type of advertisement was explicitly excluded from the rent index used by Oust(2013a) . The extra services do not come on top of the market clearing rent, but rather seem to be an alternative way of achieving market clearing.
Conclusion
This study examined how potential tenants and landlords in Oslo changed the way they used newspaper listing service to find housing and tenants after the removal of rent control. We found that the advertisement trend shifted from "housing wanted" and "housing for rent" advertisements that did not specify rent towards "housing for rent", after the removal of the rent control. Landlords become more willing to disclose their asking rent in their "housing for rent" advertisements after the removal of the rent control and the number of "housing for rent" advertisements where the key characteristics like location, type, size and asking rent were available increased dramatically. The intuition behind these question was that if potential tenants had access to a large number of "housing for rent" advertisements, with description of key characteristics this would reduce their search and mismatching cost.
We find that landlords, in the periods we are studying, went from posting "housing for rent" advertisements in the 1970s where they often asked for a special type of tenant and where they often asked for some kind of extra service in addition to, or instead of, rent, to posting "clean" advertisements where the focus was on information about the dwellings. Until the mid-1980s, it was more normal that employers posted "housing wanted" advertisements on behalf of their employees than afterwards. Until the removal of rent control 5 to 10 % of potential tenants posted "housing wanted" advertisements where they offered some kind of extra service on top of or instead of the rent.
We find that, in the years following the removal of rent control, landlords started asking for a smaller deposits and that the rental market increasingly emerged as one rental market. We conclude that the way potential tenants and landlords used newspaper listing services to find housing or a tenant changed after the removal of rent control. Moreover, we posit that it is likely that the removal of rent control reduced the tenants' search and mismatching cost in the residential rental market in Oslo. Higher search and mismatching cost under rent control is yet another way rent control reduces the total social welfare produced in the private residential rental market, reducing the social welfare to be distributed. Following Arnott and Igarashi (2000), this should give desired social welfare distributional effects.
The removal of rent control in Norway and Oslo probably came at an ideal time. The selfownership ratios were high, construction activity during the previous decades had been so high that the shortage of housing was low. Combined with the problems/cost that rent control created, some of them described in this paper, this would probably have made it easier and more popular for the politicians to remove rent control. Our result indicates that a removal of rent control will reduce potential tenants cost, in time and money, of finding a new home. Moreover, our results indicate that by removing rent control, potential tenants will be able to rent a dwelling closer to their ideal one in size, standard and location.
Data
To study the removal of rent control, we focused on the private sector of the rental market. As noted in previous sections, 18 % of Norwegian households live in private rental housing. In line with the approach adopted by Gibb (1994), Bailey (1999) and Oust (2013a), newspaper advertisements served as the data source for our study.
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